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Abstract—Threat analysis gives how potential adversaries 
exploit system weakness to achieve their goals. It identifies 
threats and defines a risk mitigation policy for a specific 
architecture, functionality and configuration. In a threat 
analysis security metrics are a challenging requirement in 
order to determine the status of network security performance 
and to further enhance it by minimizing exposure to 
considerable threats and vulnerabilities. In this paper the 
authors propose a generic methodology for threat analysis and 
security metrics in order to prioritize threats and 
vulnerabilities and proceed with security enhancement 
planning in Personal Networks (PNs).  
Keywords: threat analysis, vulnerabilities, assets, security 
metrics. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the more recent years the huge diffusion of new 
technologies and internet increases the need of security, 
because communication networks are used to transfer 
increasingly sensitive information that can be valuable and 
confidential, requiring protection against human misuse and 
also attracting attention of malicious people.  
Network security is the process by which digital 
information assets are protected, where the word security 
means protection against attacks by malicious outsiders or 
insiders.  All networks to achieve its fullest potential need to 
be protected from threats and vulnerabilities. The process to 
identify the threats, which consists in identifying how 
potential adversaries exploit system weaknesses to achieve 
their goals [1], and find appropriate countermeasures, is the 
threat analysis.This process is necessary for specifying a 
solid and complete set of security requirements so as to build 
all needed security mechanisms efficiently protecting the 
system. Moreover, when conducted on an existing system, a 
correct evaluation of the threats and vulnerabilities allows to 
prioritize them, assess the security of the system and propose 
an optimal enhancement plan. 
 
A. Related work 
The research in threat analysis has to mature as there are 
only a few established techniques to aid a formal threat 
analysis procedure and most of them are related only to 
software security. Moreover existing work do not integrate 
threat modeling - that is the process of identifying and 
documenting threats in a system - with a formal threat 
analysis. Swiderski and Snyder [2], for example, describe 
widely the threat model, but there is no method for 
determining the assets value and no risk analysis has been 
conducted, furthermore it targets only software applications. 
For explicitly modeling and analyzing security threats during 
requirements analysis a goal oriented approach has been 
proposed [3], related to software applications. Threat 
modeling [4] is also used as a step toward addressing the 
completeness of the security requirements, and the process is 
also extended to suit complex, networked systems. The 
characterization of the system can be done with Data Flow 
Diagrams, by a Network Model [4] or also with an high level 
architecture diagram [5] depending on the system, software 
application or networked system. The authors of [4] envisage 
the risk management and also the mitigation of threats. In 
software architectures the threats have been modeled also 
with misuse case [6]. UML sequence diagrams are exploited 
to describe the decision process of an attacker who would go 
through to compromise or misuse the system, and also to 
evaluate the architecture and the constraints that can be 
imposed to mitigate the threats. A framework for threat 
model for Personal Network is presented in [1], the 
methodology is general, but not complete, and the mitigation 
of threats is not included. Another practical solution is made 
by PTA Technologies [7], it consists of a software tool to 
assist software developers in assessing system risks and 
building a risk reduction policy for their systems. This tool is 
able to conduct a complete threat analysis, nevertheless the 
vulnerabilities are not ranked and the final values given to 
the threats correspond to financial fund losses, - a debatable 
methodology. CVSS [8] provides a vulnerability scoring 
system for rating IT vulnerabilities, but not for threats and it 
does not provide a methodology for threat analysis.  
The aim of this work is to improve the existing 
techniques by integrating threat modeling with a formal 
threat analysis and proposing a generic methodology valid 
for both networked systems and applications, with a new 
proposed approach in the characterization of the system. 
The authors propose the use of the UML use case 
diagrams along with the UML sequence diagrams to give an 
overview of the system and to analyze the technical 
background of the use cases. The use cases diagrams allow 
to describe what the system is able to do, covering all 
functionalities found in the scenarios, from the point of view 
of the user, whereas the sequence diagrams extend this view 
by including all entities involved in the system. A 
preliminary version of this methodology has been applied for 
a Federation of Personal Network (PN-F) [9]. A personal 
network is a person-centric network that provides access to 
personal resources, services, and contents. The interaction 
between PNs raises the federation of personal networks.  
The application of the proposed methodology to PN-Fs 
highlights that it is very difficult to prioritize threats and 
vulnerabilities with quantitative evidence because of lack of 
effective metrics, and the complex and sensitive nature of 
security [10]. In order to solve the last issue the authors 
further propose a combined methodology to rank threats and 
vulnerabilities combining attack trees and the CVSS scoring 
system.  
In the proposed approach the criticism attack trees 
receive for (i) not being able to model cycles and (ii) being 
too complex and unmanageable for complicated systems and 
attack scenarios are considered. 
Despite these drawbacks, attack trees have been used in 
and proposed for threats identification throughout the 
literature [11][12], since they offer a clear representation of 
(inter)dependencies of states reached - a common drawback 
in other methods. In order to tackle with attack tree modeling 
problems mentioned, the sequence of operations should not 
be within the scope of the modeling, but instead the final 
state reached. Moreover, tree-pruning and simplifying 
complexity techniques should be applied as in [11].  
In this context, our proposal applies a user-centric, use 
case-based approach to reduce complexity, focusing on the 
user actions (legitimate or malicious) rather than the network 
and system components. Moreover, the trees are reserved to 
show state dependencies while a vulnerability level is 
assigned to each state. Within this scope, CVSS for the 
qualitative assessment of all tree nodes - states rather than 
just use CVSS as a tool for primary metrics in a more 
complex algorithm [12] is used. In addition, CVSS keeps the 
proposed tree more realistic and updated in terms of attacker 
effort and expertise needed in comparison with tree-
geometry based algorithms [11]. The goal is to provide a 
KISS principle compliant (Keep it Short and Simple), stand-
alone complementary security management tool useful for an 
experienced system administrator, a security analyst and the 
non-expert user of a PN. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in 
section 2 a description of the threat analysis methodology is 
given, followed by security metrics for ranking threats and 
vulnerabilities, as presented in Section 3. Section 4 
summarizes the conclusions. 
 
II. PROPOSED THREAT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The threat analysis is a formal process of identifying, 
documenting and mitigating the security threats of a system, 
which can be divided in three main phases: threats modeling, 
assets mapping and building a mitigation plan. The proposed 
methodology includes the formalization of all these aspects 
with a new approach in the characterization of the system. 
Threat modeling is a method of assessing and 
documenting the security risk associated with an application 
that involves also understanding the goals of an adversary in 
attacking a system based on the assets of interest. This 
allows to enumerate the threats and also to discover the 
vulnerabilities. The threat modeling is very useful especially 
if is done in the earliest stage of the system development and 
then, as the applications evolve and requirements are better 
defined, the lists of threats and vulnerabilities can be updated 
as needed. 
Description of the system
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background
Determining Threats
Determining Vulnerabilities
Assets Mapping
Risk Management
Mitigation Plan
Threat modeling
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Figure  1. Steps of Threat analysis 
 
Asset mapping involves documenting the tangible and 
intangible resources of the system and identify the related 
entry points of the system. The assets value is used as basis 
for calculating threat risks and for prioritizing 
countermeasures, ergo assets need to be prioritized. It is 
often easier for the analyst to identify system assets via the 
process of analyzing specific threats. This implies an 
iterative approach of mapping assets and enumerating 
threats. 
The third phase of the threat analysis is building a mitigation 
plan, namely selecting from the list of all the proposed 
countermeasures, the most effective combination. The 
analysts will decide which of the proposed countermeasures 
will be included in the actual mitigation plan according to 
their experience. In order to assist with the computation of 
countermeasures' contribution to mitigating the threat's risk, 
the analyst is asked to a) estimate the mitigation level each 
countermeasure provides to the threat as if it is the only 
countermeasure in the mitigation plan and b) estimate the 
total level of mitigation provided to the threat's risk by all 
countermeasures in the mitigation plan [7]. The result of this 
analysis is a set of countermeasures that mitigate the threats 
identified. In the Figure 1 the proposed methodology 
specially adopted for PNs is shown step by step. 
 
A. Step 1. Description of the system: network overview 
and use cases 
To describe a system it is needed to understand every 
component and its interconnections, defining the scenarios 
and the use cases.  
Figure  2. UML Use cases diagram 
 
TABLE I.  DESCRIPTIVE TABLE OF UML USE CASE DIAGRAM 
Use case name Set-up a PN-F  
Goal In 
Context 
Collaborative work, Service discovery 
Preconditions  The actors are carrying portable devices, which 
incorporate MAGNET Air Interface/WiFi/UMTS 
capabilities as well as general office accessories. 
The devices are interconnected with each other. 
Successful End A PN-F is created 
Failed 
Condition 
No federation 
Primary Actors Two colleagues (PN-F creator, user) 
Secondary 
Actor 
 
Trigger The creator ask for a federation 
Main flow  
1 User1 (the creator) ask for the PN-federation by 
selecting the PN-federation definition in the user 
GUI 
2 The user GUI asks for the identifiers of the Personal 
Networks allowed to participate in the PN-
federation 
3 User1 gives the PN identifiers of both colleagues. 
4 User1 opens the PN manager, which recognizes the 
colleague’s device as a foreign node. 
5 By using the PN manager the creator selects the 
device of User2 and sends an invitation to it for the 
PN-federation with the PN manager command: 
Invite to PN-Federation. 
6 User2 opens the PN manager and accepts the 
received invitation.  
7 When the PN manager of User2 has shown a 
message about a secure PN-federation connection 
between the personal networks, User2 opens the PN 
directory manager and selects devices and the 
directories in the devices, which will be included in 
the PN-federation. These devices are the PDA and 
the laptop. 
8 User2 sends this information to the creator by the 
PN manager command: PN-federation participation 
devices. 
9 The creator selects the PDA and laptop by using the 
PN directory manager. He sends this information to 
user2 by the PN manager command: PN-federation 
participation devices. 
Extensions   
7.1 No secure connection for PN-F federation. 
7.2 No federation. 
To help the system characterization the UML use cases 
diagram and the related descriptive tables are proposed, as 
they allow to describe what the system must be able to do, by 
showing the interaction between the use cases and the actors 
involved. The use case description is in a table that contains 
all the information related to the system and the use case, i.e. 
the goal, the devices and involved technologies, the 
description of the actor and the stages to realize the use case. 
In Figure 2 an example of the UML use cases diagram  for 
the scenario “Nomadic@work” [9] and in Tab.1 the 
descriptive table related to the use case “Set-up a PN-F”. 
 
B. Step 2. Analyze the technical background of the use 
cases 
To analyze the timing sequence of all the devices and 
actors involved in the use case, the UML sequence diagrams 
are suitable, as suggested in [1]. A sequence diagram shows 
object interactions organized according to their timing 
sequence. The sequence view describes the system in 
execution. It can be used to model the behavior of the system 
by representing the realization of a use case scenario. It 
depicts the objects involved in the scenario and the sequence 
of messages exchanged between the objects. 
In this step it is possible to analyze how the technologies 
are used and who is using them.  
. 
C. Step 3. Identify Assets 
In this step everything that can be damaged or violated in 
the network should be determined. Assets can be tangible or 
abstract, general or related to a use case. The assets and their 
protection are very important, as organizations often tend to 
focus on threats rather than on protecting assets, which 
leaves the entire system vulnerable [13]. 
In general the assets depend on the situations and on the 
users, but it is possible also to identify some general assets 
for the system, e.g. the IDs of the owner or the devices itself. 
The new approach of using use case diagrams and the 
descriptive tables allows to identify the general and specific 
assets of each use cases by analyzing them. In this step the 
assets are enumerated and stored in a table as a record with 
ID, name and a brief description. In the next steps, this table 
can be checked and updated in case some new assets are 
found. 
D. Step 4. Determining Threats 
Using the information gathered so far it is possible to 
start to identify the threats and the potential threat-sources of 
the system. A threat-source is defined as any circumstance or 
event with the potential to cause harm to a system. 
According to [14] the threat sources are classified in: natural, 
human, and environmental. 
 By analyzing the use cases, technical functionalities and 
sequence diagrams, it is possible to identify the threats and 
threat-sources. Afterwards the threats have to be correlated 
with the assets and with the entry points. The output of this 
step is the threats profile, similar the solution that Swiderski 
and Snyder suggest in [2]. In the  table every threat is 
associated with an ID, a name or classification, the source of 
threat, the assets involved and the entry points associated, an 
example can be found in [9]. Finally the threats must also be 
analyzed to determine whether the system is susceptible to 
them. 
 
E. Step 5. Determining Vulnerabilities 
The goal of this step is to develop a list of system 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the potential threat-
sources.  When all the threats and their scenarios have been 
described it is possible to deduct what the threats are 
exploiting. A table will be filled in with the main real 
vulnerabilities and the corresponding threats that are 
exploiting in the specific use cases analyzed in the previous 
sections. Each vulnerability will be assigned an ID, followed 
by the description, the name and the corresponding threat. 
Another way to evaluate if the system is susceptible to the 
threats that have been identified is to use the attack trees. 
This approach has been adopted in section 3. 
 
F. Step 6. Asset Mapping 
In this step the list of assets determined in the step 3 is 
checked to determine if all the assets have been included. It 
is important also determining the valiance of the assets and 
the risk that the owner of the assets is willing to accept [1], 
and based on these values prioritizing them. To assign a 
value to the assets is not easy because the value can be 
personal and the priorities of the people can be different, 
nevertheless here it has been suggested three different 
values: 
• High, assets with this value have to be protected with 
a high level of security; they are directly linked to 
the control of the system, with services that require 
highly secure level, or that have a big financial 
value.   
• Medium, assets linked to access to common services, 
not critical, but still important with an intermediate 
financial value. 
• Low value for assets of minor importance. 
The values have to be assigned taking in to the account 
the scenarios and the particular use cases. 
G. Step 7. Risk Management 
The risk management helps to balance between what it is 
acceptable and what it is possible. 
From the threat and vulnerability list it is possible to 
extract the information about which threat pose the highest 
risk value. The aspects, which have to be taken into account 
to assess the risk, are the impact, the damage to the assets 
when the threat would materialize, the size of the 
vulnerabilities and the likelihood that the threat will attempt 
to materialize. The method explained in section 3 helps to 
rank threats and vulnerabilities, which can be accepted, 
transferred or mitigated as suggested in [4]. 
H. Step 8. Mitigation Plan 
The last step of the threats analysis is the construction of 
a mitigation plan that involves the selection of the 
countermeasures. In this step the threats selected for 
mitigation must be addressed by one or more 
countermeasures. To build a mitigation plan it is necessary to 
identify the countermeasures, i.e. have a list of the 
countermeasures and a map of the relationship between 
countermeasures and vulnerabilities, and from this list to 
select the most effective combination. The decision of which 
of proposed countermeasures will be included in the actual 
mitigation plan is taken by the analyst. 
The result of the process is a set of proposed 
countermeasures that would mitigate the threats that were 
identified. Since the implementation of all the proposed 
countermeasures is, in most of the cases, impractical due to 
constraints in budget, time and resources, the goal of a 
beneficial threats analysis process is to propose the set of the 
most cost-effective countermeasures against the identified 
threat [7]. 
 
III. METRICS AND MEASUREMENTS TO PRIORITIZE 
THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
Valid security metrics -necessary in the last steps of the 
proposed methodology- are quite a challenging requirement 
in a threat analysis in order to determine the status of 
network security performance and to further enhance it by 
minimizing exposure to considerable threats and 
vulnerabilities. As it was shown on section 1.1 solutions 
offered by state of the art techniques on this area are either 
inadequate or debatable, due to the lack of a standard 
approach or metric system. Towards these goals, security 
specialists need to prioritize the threats in the context of the 
specific system and therefore subsequently need: 
• A structured overview of the security context, which 
would encapsulate all vulnerabilities of the system, 
their interrelationship and their interaction with 
security (or worst-case non-security) components in 
the system.  
• A standard measurement expressing the severity and 
risk of every vulnerability, and therefore the 
significance of the corresponding threat. 
For this purpose, the proposed solution is adopting a 
combination of Bruce Schneier’s Attack Trees [15] and of 
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [16][8].   
Attack Trees represent attacks against a 
system in a tree structure, with the goal as 
the root node and different ways of 
achieving that goal as leaf nodes. In this 
way, there can be many potential paths in 
the tree for an attacker via exploitation of 
different vulnerabilities and in various ways. 
In order to build the complete structure of all 
applying attack trees to the system, assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities need to be 
carefully analyzed according to the 
methodology described previously in this 
paper. As a second step, tree nodes need to 
be assigned values in order to evaluate 
which are the critical paths that need to be 
counter measured in the attack tree structure. 
Once this is achieved, optimal paths for 
attackers are revealed, underlining in this 
way security enhancement priorities for the 
analysts. Since attacks may differ 
significantly, corresponding measurement 
and value assignment on the node trees is a 
challenging task. E.g. very sophisticated 
attacks on a crypto-algorithm [17], network 
based attacks like Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) [18][19] and social 
engineering attacks or user negligence [20] 
are all attacks which vary significantly in 
terms of quality and quantity of resources 
required. Moreover, as each system has its 
own security requirements, the impact of a 
specific attack also changes according to the case. A DoS in 
a banking system would mean significant financial damage 
for the organization while a DoS in a chat server would mean 
just a few complaining users. It is therefore evident that a 
standard measurement needs to be followed, so as to 
establish a common and stable view for evaluating security. 
For this reason, the authors are proposing CVSS as the 
standard way for assigning values on the Attack Tree nodes. 
The CVSS is a vendor agnostic, industry open standard 
designed to convey vulnerability severity and help determine 
urgency and priority of response. The CVSS assessment 
divides the vulnerability concerns into three areas: 
• Base, for qualities directly characterizing the 
vulnerability. 
• Temporal, for characteristics concerning the 
vulnerability exploitability and lifetime. 
• Environmental, for characteristics dependable to the 
specific system and environment. 
Since the CVSS provides an open framework for 
vulnerability scoring, security specialists and users 
throughout the world can exchange views based on the 
standard measurement, forming also public CVSS 
vulnerability bulletins for everyone to collect information 
from. By choosing CVSS for filling the values on the Attack 
Trees, the authors aimed into combining the benefit from all 
features belonging to these metric tools, with the main goal 
being mainly to use attack trees for providing an integrated 
view of the security of the system, rather than a case specific  
Figure  3. PN Identity Theft Attack Tree 
one (e.g. network only security, software and operating 
systems security), and CVSS for providing individual 
metrics for each threat connected with each of the tree nodes. 
Using an open standard further facilitates the construction of 
the trees, since the whole community contributes in the 
proper update of the Attack Trees through the CVSS 
vulnerability bulletins. In order to better understand the 
CVSS-based Attack Tree security metric methodology and 
their connection with the proposed threat analysis 
methodology in this paper, an example case is depicted in 
Figure 3 for a Personal Network (PN) [21] Identity Theft 
scenario. The example focuses on the asset: “Identity” of a 
Personal Network. All threats and vulnerabilities and their 
interrelations are analysed and the corresponding attack tree 
is formed. Next, the CVSS scores on tree nodes are either 
calculated according to CVSS equations either retrieved 
from vulnerability databases in case of a reported threat such 
as the Bit-flipping attack on IPsec (vulnerability identified as 
CVE-2005-0039 [22]). Actual CVSS scoring is performed 
for values in red, since these nodes correspond to a 
vulnerability exploitation risk, while nodes in blue 
correspond to a direct consequence of successful attack(s) 
and inherit the max CVSS score of all their child nodes 
scores. Once the tree is properly filled with scores, 
evaluation and enhancement planning can be achieved by 
identifying vulnerability paths on the tree leading to the 
Identity Theft
Max() CVSS: 6.4
Steal a Personal
Node
CVSS: 0.8 (LOW)
Hack a Personal 
Node
CVSS: 4 (MED)
Deceive User 
through Social 
Engineering
CVSS: 2.5 (LOW)
Eavesdropping 
during PN pairing
CVSS: 0.8 (LOW)
User Profile 
Disclosed
Max() CVSS: 6.4
Learn passphrase 
from user
Max() CVSS: 2.5
Keyboard logging, 
learn passphrases
CVSS: 3.5 (LOW)
Port Scanning
CVSS: 1.4 (LOW)
Brute Force attack 
pairing messages
CVSS: 3.8 (LOW)
Learn PIN used 
during pairing
Max() CVSS: 3.8
Learn Personal 
(PN) key
Max() CVSS: 6.4
Brute Force attack 
encrypted files
CVSS: 3.1 (LOW)
Bit-flipping attack 
on Ipsec
CVSS: 6.4 (MED)
Tamper access 
policies and files
Max() CVSS: 4
Learn Confidential 
Information
Max() CVSS: 6.4
highest CVSS scores. Using CVSS for quantifying the threat, 
the threats prioritization is now possible, with the highest 
priority threat being the bit-flipping attack vulnerability on 
the IPsec protocol. The added value of using attack trees is 
clear during the mitigation plan of the system. E.g. according 
to CVSS alone, hacking a Personal Node is a considerable 
threat, and is in fact the second priority. However, according 
to the attack tree this attack is actually a next step following 
the port scanning attack, which has quite low CVSS score, 
mainly because firewalls and correct security configuration 
counter this attack to a great extent. Following this rationale, 
and always according to security policies and requirements 
of the specific system, administrators may choose to propose 
a mitigation plan enhancing nodes in the tree with lower 
CVSS values, but part of a more consistent attack path (e.g. 
social engineering attack path). 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper has been proposed a generic methodology 
that integrates threat modeling with a formal threat analysis 
for PNs. The methodology is divided in three phases: threat 
modeling, asset mapping and mitigation plan. A new 
proposed approach to characterize the system and to identify 
the assets has been adopted utilizing the UML use case 
diagrams, whether general or use case specific. The 
identification of the threats, entry points and vulnerabilities 
concludes the threat modeling phase. The asset mapping 
follows in order to be used in risk assessment. The need to 
quantify threats and vulnerabilities in this phase has been 
conducted via use of a combined methodology to rank 
threats and vulnerabilities using both attack trees and CVSS 
scoring system, as depicted by the provided example for a 
Personal Network Identity Theft scenario. Finally the 
mitigation plan can be carried out.  
This proposed work is useful in every system to 
accomplish a complete threats analysis, evaluating threats 
and vulnerabilities with standard measurement, with 
emphasis on user-centric architectures such as that of a PNs. 
Future work will focus on the validation of the proposed 
approach and the development of a proof-of concept stand-
alone complementary security management tool useful for an 
experienced system administrator, a security analyst and the 
non-expert user of a PNs.. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The authors would like to thank the Danish project 
SUBWAY (Secure SDR-enabled wireless networks ability) 
founded by CSDR (Center for Software Defined Radio). 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] N. R. Prasad “Threat Model Framework and Methodology for 
Personal Network”, Communication Systems Software and 
Middleware, COMSWARE 2007. 
[2] F. Swiderski, W. Snyder, “Threat Modeling”, Microsoft Press 2004. 
[3] E. Oladimeji, S. Supakkul and L. Chung, “Security Threat Modeling: 
A Goal-Oriented Approach,” Proc. SEA’06, Dallas, TX, Dec. 2006 
pp. 178-185. 
[4] S. Myagmar, A. Lee, and W. Yurcik, “Threat modeling as a basis for 
security requirements,” In Proceedings of the Symposium on 
Requirements Engineering for Information Security, Paris, Aug 2005. 
[5] J.D. Meier, A. Mackman, M. Dunner, S. Vasireddy, and A. Murukan, 
“Improving Web Application Security: Threats and 
Countermeasures”, Microsoft Press, 2003. 
[6] J. Pauli and D. Xu, "Threat-driven Architectural Design of Secure 
Information Systems", Proc. of the 7th International Conference on 
Enterprise Information Systems, ICEEIS 2005,  Miami, FL, USA, 
May 2005 
[7] Ygor Goldberg, “Practical Threat Analysis for the Software 
Industry”, http://www.securitydocs.com/library/2848. 
[8] CVSS documentation, Forum of Incident Response and Security 
Teams, http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.html. 
[9] http://www.ist-magnet.org/ MAGNET beyond/D4.4.2 “Analysis, 
Verification and Evaluation”, June 2008 
[10] S. A. Butler, “Security attribute evaluation method: a cost-benefit 
approach”, Proceedings of the 24th ICSE, May 2002 
[11] Indrajit Ray and Nayot Poolsapassit, “Using Attack Trees to Identify 
Malicious Attacks from Authorized Insiders”, Computer Security – 
ESORICS 2005,  Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Volume 3679/2005, pp. 231-246, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005. 
[12] Igor Kotenko and Mikhail Stepashkin, “Attack Graph Based 
Evaluation of Network Security”, Communications and Multimedia 
Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 4237/2006, pp. 
216-227, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2006 
[13] J. Steven, G.Peterson, “Security lesson learned from Société 
Générale”, IEEE Security & Privacy, 2008. 
[14] G. Stoneburner, A. Goguen, A. Feringa, “Risk Management Guide 
for Information Technology Systems”, Recommendations of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, July 2002. 
[15] Schneier Bruce, "Attack Trees". Dr Dobb's Journal, v.24, n.12, 
December 1999, web source retrieved on 01-09-2008. 
[16] Patriciu Victor-Valieriu, Priescu Iustin, Nicolaescu Sebastian, 
“Security Metrics for Enterprise Information Systems” Journal of 
Applied Quantitative Methods, JAQM, Vol 1, No. 2, Winter 2006. 
[17] Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition. John Wiley 
& Sons, p. 151, 1996. 
[18] Lee Garber, "Denial-of-Service Attacks Rip the Internet," Computer, 
vol. 33,  no. 4,  pp. 12-17,  Apr.,  2000. 
[19] Mirkovic, J. and Reiher, P., “A taxonomy of DDoS attack and DDoS 
defense mechanisms”, SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev. 34, 2, 
April 2004. 
[20] Gragg, David. “A Multi-Level Defense against Social Engineering.” 
SANS Reading Room, March 13, 2003, URL: 
http://www.sans.org/rr/paper.php?id=920 (Aug 12, 2003). 
[21] Kyriazanos, D., et Al., “Overview of a personal network prototype”, 
Annual Review of Communications: Volume 59, p.521-534, Intl. 
Engineering Consortiu, 2007. 
[22] Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2005-0039, 
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search?execution=e1 
 
 
 
